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THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE: TWO NEW AND EASY




In this bicentennial year of the Constitution of the United States
the tension between the national and state (and local) governments
continues. State taxation of interstate commerce remains a classic
area of this tension. Two selected quotations serve to illustrate the
current vitality of this struggle. First, the following words were stated
by a state court:
[W]e realize that the results in the decisions discussed in this opinion as well as
in our [other] recent [interstate commerce taxation] decisions may give the ap-
pearance that we will allow the State to expand its taxing powers [over interstate
commerce] in sponge-like fashion and with only perfunctory review.'
In contrast, these comments were by a federal court:
Justice Holmes' words are relevant:
'I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power
to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if
we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States. For one
in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are not trained
to national views and how often action is taken that embodies what the Commerce
Clause was meant to end.' 0. Holmes, Law and the Court, in Collected Legal
Papers 291, 295-296 (reprint, 1952).2
* A.B., West Virginia University, 1958; LL.B., West Virginia University College of Law, 1964,
The Order of the Coif; Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, 1974-1980;
Justice, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 1981-present.
** B.S., Morris Harvey College, 1972; J.D., West Virginia University College of Law, 1975;
Law Clerk to Justice Thomas E., McHugh, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, May, 1985-
present.
I Western Md. Ry. v. Goodwin, 167 W. Va. 804, 828, 282 S.E.2d 240, 254 (1981) (citations
omitted), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 456 U.S. 952 (1982).
2 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 653 n.20 (1981) (Blackmun, Powell
and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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The purpose of this article is narrow: to focus upon recent opin-
ions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals which involve
the question of whether there is a sufficient nexus (connection) to
sustain a tax, primarily the West Virginia business and occupation
tax,3 against a foreign corporation whose only contact with this State,
with respect to the transactions in question, is the solicitation, on
a less than full-time basis, of product orders, or activities incidental
thereto, by nonresident representatives of such corporation. An ex-
haustive treatment of the subject is not intended.
II. TiB FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS AND MAJOR UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT OPINIONS ON GROSS RECEIPTS TAXES
An analysis of whether there is a sufficient nexus to sustain a
state (or local) privilege (gross receipts) tax on interstate commerce
involves the due process claus& and the commerce clause5 of the
Constitution of the United States. "Constitutional provisions are
often so glossed over with commentary that imperceptibly we tend
to construe the commentary rather than the text." ' 6 When courts
construe the case law commentary rather than the text of the Con-
stitution and start adding their own judicial "glosses," the added
"layers" or "wrinkles" inevitably create more confusion. "[T]he
Court's opinion will accomplish the seemingly impossible feat of
leaving this area of the law more confused than it found it.'"' Such
3W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2(a) (Supp. 1986) and W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2c (1983). The West Virginia
business and occupation tax, a privilege (gross receipts) tax, imposed on different classifications of
business activities, including sales of tangible property, was, with respect to most classifications, re-
placed on July 1, 1987, by a severance tax or a business franchise tax, as the case may be. W. VA.
CODE § 11-13-2(b) (1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 11-13A-1 to -23 (1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 11-23-I to -24
(1987). If the recently enacted legislation does not raise sufficient revenues, it remains to be seen
whether there will be a return to the business and occupation tax.
4 The due process clause reads: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of laws; . .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
I The commerce clause provides: "The Congress shall have power ... To regulate Commerce
... among the several States .... " U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Commerce Clause does not
state a prohibition; it merely grants specific power to Congress. The prohibitive effect of the Clause
on state legislation results from the Supremacy Clause [U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2] and the decisions
of this Court." Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S.
734, 749 (1978).
6 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (due process clause analysis). 2
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is the case, it seems, with each succeeding opinion on state taxation
of interstate commerce.
Before discussing the recent "tax nexus" opinions of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, a summary of a few of the
relevant opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States is in
order because it is the federal forum which is the final decision
maker on a question of state taxation of interstate commerce.
In Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue,8 the Supreme Court
of the United States held that certain interstate sales were subject
to a so-called gross receipts tax of the destination state because such
sales were "channeled" through an in-state office, that is, the orders
were received there or the goods were distributed from there. On
the other hand, it was held that where the foreign corporation shoul-
ders its burden of "dissociating" particular transactions from the
local business, the gross receipts tax with respect to those trans-
actions is invalid. The Court held:
Where a corporation chooses to stay at home in all respects [with respect to
certain transactions] except to send abroad advertising or drummers to solicit
orders which are sent directly to the [out-of-state] home office for acceptance,
filling, and delivery back to the buyer, it is obvious that the State of the buyer
has no local grip on the seller [with respect to such transactions].9
In General Motors Corp. v. Washington,10 the Court upheld a
destination state's so-called gross receipts tax with respect to inter-
state sales of motor vehicles and parts, where the motor vehicle sales
were "enmeshed in local connections," by the involvement of nu-
merous resident representatives and in-state offices, so that there
was specific nexus for such sales. With respect to one miniscule
category of sales by one division (the less frequently needed parts
and accessories), there was no involvement of in-state personnel or
facilities. Applying a general nexus test called a "bundle-of-cor-
porate-activity" test, the Court upheld the tax with respect to these
parts and accessories by borrowing nexus from the "maze of local
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
10 General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), overruled, in part, on other
grounds, Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2820 (1987).
1987]
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connections" relating to the sales of motor vehicles."' The sales of
the motor vehicles obviously created a demand for the parts and
accessories. In finding a "bundle of corporate activity," the Court
did not mention the "unitary business" principle. 2 The General Mo-
tors Court quoted Norton approvingly for its transactional "dis-
sociation"-from-local-business principle.
Less than a year after General Motors was decided, the Court,
in American Oil Co. v. Neil, 13 quoted Norton approvingly and ap-
plied its transactional "dissociation"-from-local-business principle to
invalidate an excise tax against an out-of-state vendor, under the
due process clause, because of an insufficient nexus for the trans-
action in question. No in-state facilities or personnel contributed to
the sale. The Court called nexus "the outstanding prerequisite on
state power to tax.' 1 4 The Court also concluded that the fact that
the foreign corporation was authorized to do business in the des-
tination state and had, for other transactions, entered into the local
market in that state was insufficient to uphold the tax as against
attack under the due process clause. 5
Another post-General Motors case is Dunbar-Stanley Studios,
Inc. v. Alabama.'6 The Court therein recognized again that the com-
merce clause precludes a privilege tax on an interstate enterprise
whose only contacts with the taxing state are the solicitation (by
nonresident representatives) of orders for merchandise and the sub-
sequent delivery of the merchandise within the taxing state. The
nonresidents' acts of soliciting orders or making deliveries are min-
imal activities within a state without which there can be no interstate
commerce.
Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 17 upheld
a destination state's so-called gross receipts tax on a foreign cor-
poration's interstate sales business. There, the foreign corporation's
General Motors, 377 U.S. at 447-48.
32 The "unitary business" principle is discussed in subsection III.B. of this article.
" American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
14 Id. at 458.
11 Id. at 457-58.
36 Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc, v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537 (1969).
" Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
[Vol. 90
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sole contact in the taxing state, namely, one resident representative
with a full-time job in such state, "made possible the realization
and continuance of valuable contractual relations between" the tax-
payer and its principal customer in that state. 18 The Court apparently
did not borrow the nexus existing as to the principal customer in
order to sustain the tax with respect to sales to other customers in
the state. The resident representative apparently had no contacts with
these other customers. As in General Motors and American Oil, the
Standard Pressed Steel Court cited Norton approvingly and noted
that there was no disagreement in Norton as to the "governing prin-
ciple." Rather, it was observed that the dissenters in Norton believed
that the taxpayer had not carried its burden of "dissociating" the
sales in question from the taxpayer's local business. 19
In the much heralded case of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady,0 the Court was also confronted with a challenge by a foreign
corporation to a destination state's so-called gross receipts tax. The
challengp was solely upon the basis that the tax violated the com-
merce rlause under Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor2' be-
cause it was a tax on the privilege of conducting an exclusively
interstate business. The Court overruled Spector Motor Service. The
Court did not attach constitutional significance to the formal lan-
guage of the taxing statute. Consequently it declined to hold that
a privilege tax on interstate commerce is per se unconstitutional.
The Court looked, instead, to the practical, economic effect of the
tax. In so doing the Court stated an often-quoted, four-part, due
process/commerce clause test for a state's gross receipts tax. A gross
receipts tax is valid when it "is applied to an activity with a sub-
stantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the
services provided by the State.' '22 Note well that the first part of
this test requires that the nexus be between the activity of the tax-
payer and the State, not merely between the taxpayer and the State,
11 Id. at 562.
19 Id. at 562-63.
'0 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
21 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added).
1987]
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and that the nexus must be substantial, not merely "a" nexus. This
is an example of functional, economic analysis requiring case-by-
case determination.
That there must be more than "a" nexus is driven home in
National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization23
decided less than a month after Complete Auto Transit. The Su-
preme Court of the United States in National Geographic rejected
a "slightest presence" standard for tax nexus, even for a secondary
liability for a "collection" tax (sales or use tax). A fortiori the Court
would reject a "slightest presence" standard for tax nexus for a
"direct" tax (such as a gross receipts tax) imposed upon the out-
of-state vendor. To sustain the use tax in National Geographic, the
Court relied upon the fact that the foreign corporation maintained
two offices and resident representatives in the taxing (destination)
state. 24 Quoting National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Rev-
enue,25 the Court in National Geographic stressed "'the sharp dis-
tinction [even for collection taxes] . . . between mail order sellers
with retail outlets, [resident] solicitors, or property within [the tax-
ing] State, and those . . . who do no more than communicate with
customers in the State by mail or common carrier [or nonresident
solicitors] as part of a general interstate business.
'"'26
Finally, the Court in National Geographic distinguished collec-
tion taxes from direct taxes. It quoted Norton for the transactional
"dissociation" -from-local-business principle for direct taxes (such as
gross receipts taxes), thereby repudiating the applicability to direct
taxes of the borrowed or general nexus principle upheld in National
Geographic as to the use tax collection duties of an out-of-state
seller. "The Society argues in other words that there must exist a
nexus or relationship not only between the seller and the taxing
State, but also between the activity of the seller sought to be taxed
and the seller's activity [such as maintaining offices] within the
State." ' 27 Citing Norton and American Oil, the Court noted that a
23 National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
14 Id. at 555-56.
25 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
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showing that particular transactions are dissociated from the local
business is fatal to a direct tax. On the other hand, such dissociation
does not bar the imposition of the use-tax-collection duty because
such a tax, unlike a direct tax, requires only a connection between
the taxing state and the person it seeks to tax.28
In Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Department of Rev-
enue,29 a very recent opinion involving the business and occupation
tax of the State of Washington, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that having resident sales representatives in the taxing
jurisdiction (the destination state) who establish and maintain the
market constitutes a sufficient nexus to uphold the business and
occupation tax on the sales. The fact that the resident sales rep-
resentatives were independent contractors rather than employees was
without constitutional significance. 0
In summary, these opinions of the Supreme Court of the United
States set forth two holdings on nexus in so-called gross receipts tax
cases involving interstate sales, which holdings have been "glossed
over" in recent opinions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. First, nexus to sustain a gross receipts tax must be "sub-
stantial" under Complete Auto Transit's due process/commerce
clause analysis and under the traditional "jurisdiction to tax" re-
quirement of the due process clause, also recognized in Complete
Auto Transit.31 A "substantial" nexus is present only when there
is a more-or-less permanent, physical presence in the taxing juris-
diction, such as an in-state office or a resident representative, which
facilitates the sales. Such a presence makes "possible the realization
and continuance of valuable contractual relations .... 32 An out-
of-state vendor's mere economic exploitation of the market in the
destination (taxing) state by utilizing instrumentalities of interstate
1 Id. at 560-61.
' Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987).
'o Id. at 2821. The Court held, though, that the exemption from the manufacturing tax provided
by the Washington business and occupation tax statute to in-state manufacturers/wholesalers only
was unconstitutional under the commerce clause as discriminatory against interstate commerce. It is
beyond the scope of this article to discuss this discrimination issue.
complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 281.
32 Standard Pressed Steel, 419 U.S. at 562.
19871
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commerce, such as interstate ("direct") mail, interstate (network)
television or radio advertising or solicitation by nonresident repre-
sentatives ("drummers") on a part-time basis in this State, does not
constitute a "substantial" nexus.
Second, nexus to sustain a gross receipts tax must be between
the taxing state and the activity or transaction in question, not merely
between the taxing state and the taxpayer. That is, if the taxpayer
"dissociates" the particular activity or transaction from any local
presence in the taxing state, there is an insufficient nexus for taxation
of that activity. Again, this is functional, economic analysis ap-
plauded in Complete Auto Transit. This analysis also recognizes that
nexus is critical in gross receipts tax cases involving interstate sales,
while apportionment in such cases, once nexus is found, is "au-
tomatic," especially in light of the apportionment mechanism, set-
tled by case law, of upholding the tax in the destination state and
prohibiting the tax in the state of origin for the product. 33
III. RECENT TAX NExus OPINIONS OF THE WEST VIRGINIA
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
As interpretations of the Constitution of the United States, ju-
dicial "glosses"3 4 have been added in this State to those of the Su-
33 The majority opinion in J.C. Penney Co. v. Hardesty, 164 W. Va. 525, 264 S.E.2d 604 (1979),
authored by Justice Neely, also recognizes the emphasis upon nexus in gross receipts tax cases involving
interstate sales and the de-emphasis upon apportionment in such cases:
'Of course it would make analytic nonsense to talk about a "fairly apportioned" "un-
apportioned" tax if the concept of "apportionment" were intended to have any real meaning
here. Instead, what seems to have happened in cases like Standard [Pressed Steel] is that
the Court, while paying lip service to the apportionment principle, has ignored it in fact
and had looked to other factors to determine the constitutionality of taxes imposed on the
unapportioned gross receipts from interstate sales activity. Notwithstanding doctrinal var-
iations, and assuming that nexus requirements have been satisfied, over the past four decades
gross receipts taxes on interstate sales have generally been sustained when imposed by the
state to which the goods were shipped and prohibited when imposed by the state from which
the goods were sent.' Hellerstein, "State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme
court," 62 Va. L. Rev. 149, 171 (1976) ....
... [A] gross receipts tax may be levied in the state of delivery if there are sufficient
contacts to create a tax nexus but cannot be levied in the state of manufacture. This seems
as reasonable as any other method of apportionment since its universal application will
avoid the evil of double taxation and it has the further advantage of being easy to administer.
Id. at 537-38, 264 S.E.2d at 612 (emphasis added).
34 See text accompanying supra notes 6-7.
[Vol. 90
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preme Court of the United States in cases involving the West Virginia
business and occupation tax and in cases involving the gross income
tax imposed by the West Virginia carrier income tax statute.3 5 Two
new tax nexus tests for gross receipts taxes have been created in the
process, namely, (1) a "purposive-revenue-generating-activity" test
and (2) a "unitary business" nexus (not apportionment) test. With
these two new tests, the capture of tax revenues from interstate
businesses is virtually a certainty.36
A. Purposive-revenue-generating-activity nexus test
In Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Goodwin,37 Justice Neely gave
birth to a creature theretofore unknown in tax nexus jurisprudence,
specifically, a "purposive-revenue-generating-activity" nexus test:
"We conclude that purposive, revenue generating activities in the
State are sufficient to render a person liable for taxes." ' 38 This test
stands for the proposition that mere economic exploitation of the
market by utilizing instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as
solicitation by nonresidents, interstate television or radio advertising
or interstate mail solicitation, is a sufficient nexus to uphold any
tax. We have not located any opinion of the Supreme Court of the
" W. VA CODE § 11-12A-2 (1983) imposed a tax on intrastate gross income of certain carrier
businesses. This section was repealed effective July 1, 1987. W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-24(a) (1987).
Like the business and occupation tax, it may, however, be reinstated, due to a potential need for
additional State revenues. See supra note 3.
W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-3 (1983) imposed a tax on net income measured by apportioned interstate
net income of certain carrier business. It too was repealed as of July 1, 1987.
'6 In the opinions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided after January 1,
1981 and discussed herein, Justice McHugh either dissented (e.g., Cincinnati Milacron v. Hardesty,
290 S.E.2d 902 (,V. Va. 1982)), did not participate in the consideration or decision thereof because
of involvement therein as a circuit judge (e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 303 S.E.2d 706 (,V. Va.
1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 638 (1984)), or in one per curiam case (Williams & Co. v. Dailey, 303 S.E.2d
737 (W. Va. 1983)) succumbed to the "irresistible force of the tide" and noted no dissent. The opinions
as reported in the regional reporter (S.E.2d) do not in each case accurately indicate Justice McHugh's
nonparticipation in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals opinion (e.g., Armco). The originals
of the opinions or orders of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on file with the Clerk of
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals do indicate such nonparticipation.
1 Western Md. Ry. v. Goodwin, 167 W. Va. 804, 282 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1981), appeal dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question, 456 U.S. 952 (1982). This opinion consolidates
three separate cases. For the purpose of this article, the Union Barge Line portion of the opinion is
particularly relevant to the question of what constitutes a sufficient nexus.
11 Western Md. Ry., 167 W. Va. at 809, 282 S.E.2d at 244.
1987]
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United States which is precedent for such a proposition. Rather, as
stated previously, that Court, even in and after Complete Auto
Transit, has always required there to be a more-or-less permanent,
physical presence in the taxing jurisdiction to sustain the tax, such
as resident representatives or in-state offices which facilitate the
transactions in question. 39 Under the "purposive-revenue-generating-
activity" test, even interstate (network) television or radio adver-
tising or interstate ("direct") mail solicitation would appear to con-
stitute a sufficient nexus for the destination state to tax the business
of selling products shipped into such state by common carrier. Such
activities are purposive and generate revenue. In fact, it would ap-
pear that there is nothing which would fail such nexus test. Far
from echoing Complete Auto Transit's cry for functional, economic
analysis on a case-by-case basis, the "purposive-revenue-generating-
activity" test is a return to a per se rule, only now, unlike in Spector
Motor Service, the result is that everything is taxable, rather than
nontaxable.
The types of contacts found to furnish a sufficient nexus in the
Union Barge Line portion of the Western Maryland Ry. opinion
illustrate the extreme ease with which a sufficient nexus and State
services are found in tax cases in this State. The West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals made the following "findings." Union Barge
Line's miniscule intrastate business was done primarily as an ac-
commodation to its interstate business. (This fact, contrary to the
"' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), cited in Western Md. Ry., pro-
vides no support for a purposive-revenue-generating-activity test for nexus in tax cases. The foreign
corporation in International Shoe employed eleven to thirteen salesmen who were residents of the
taxing state and whose principal activities were confined to that state. International Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 313. In that case it is also significant that Congress had explicitly authorized the unemployment
tax involved therein.
Similarly, Virginia Foods of Bluefield, Va., Inc. v. Dailey, 161 W. Va. 94, 239 S.E.2d 770
(1977), upholding a West Virginia business and occupation tax assessment with respect to a Virginia
corporation's sales to West Virginia customers, is not authority for a purposive-revenue-generating-
activity test for tax nexus. In Virginia Foods, the contacts with this state included full-time solicitation
and other services by two representatives who were residents of West Virginia. Virginia Foods, 161
W. Va. at 101, 239 S.E.2d at 775.
The authors of this article are aware of only one decision outside West Virginia which supports
an economic-exploitation-of-the-market standard for nexus in tax cases, namely, American Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 238 Or. 340, 346, 395 P.2d 127, 130 (1964), a net income tax
case involving leases. Accord, 1 J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAxATION, 6.6, 6.7[2] (1983).
[Vol. 90
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court's opinion, indicates that the interstate business would have
occurred without any intrastate business.) On an infrequent basis
the taxpayer's crews purchased food and fuel in West Virginia. If
any of the taxpayer's barges or tugs break down or become damaged
in West Virginia, the taxpayer at times will have them repaired here.
If a crewman becomes ill while traveling through West Virginia he
may be taken to a West Virginia hospital, and most hospitals receive
some State aid. The court stated that a "taxpayer's burden of proof
in such [interstate commerce taxation] cases is substantial, but it is
not insurmountable ... ."10 Query: How could the taxpayer in that
case have disproved the hypothetical, speculative contacts "found"
by the court?
Justice Neely utilized his "purposive-revenue-generating-activity"
test again in Cincinnati Milacron Co. v. Hardesty.41 In that case the
solicitation of product orders on a part-time basis in this State by
nonresident representatives of a foreign corporation was held to be
"purposive, revenue generating activities" sufficient for nexus pur-
poses. Standard Pressed Steel and General Motors, cited in support,
are actually authorities contra. In Standard Pressed Steel the quality
or nature of the contacts was materially distinguishable, specifically,
there was a resident representative therein to provide the requisite
more-or-less permanent, physical presence. In General Motors the
quality and quantum of contacts were materially distinguishable,
specifically, there were numerous resident representatives and in-
state offices which contributed to the sales.
Referring to the State's argument that nexus is automatically met
by the temporary, periodic presence of "drummers" in this State,
the author of the dissenting opinion in Cincinnati Milacron re-
marked: "That doctrine is uncomplicated and simple to apply. I
fear that this Court is being lured into that greedy embrace.''42 Then
these comments were added: "I always thought that a sufficient
nexus between the activities of the taxpayer and the State was re-
quired. How much longer will sufficient modify nexus in West Vir-
40 Western Md. Ry., 167 W. Va. at 828, 282 S.E.2d at 254.
4' Cincinnati Milacron Co. v. Hardesty, 290 S.E.2d 902, (,V. Va. 1982).
42 Id. at 905 (McHugh, J., dissenting).
1987]
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ginia?" '43 The answer appears to be, not any longer. Judicial
predictability has apparently triumphed.
A final case applying the "purposive-revenue-generating-activ-
ity" test is Williams & Co. v. Dailey,44 Solicitation on a part-time
basis in this State by nonresident representatives in a particular geo-
graphic section of the State generated the sales in question. The
record established only hypothetical, purely speculative assistance by
personnel and facilities in a separate geographic section of the State.
Not surprisingly, a sufficient nexus was easily found with respect
to the sales in the geographic section in question. There were, after
all, "purposive, revenue generating activities." Tyler Pipe Industries,
National Geographic, Dunber-Stanley Studios, American Oil and
Norton, discussed in section II of this article, are contrary precedents
of the Supreme Court of the United States. Taxpayers may well
wonder whether Williams represents the "high water mark" in the
wave of cases employing the extremely broad "purposive-revenue-
generating-activity" test. Taxpayers may also wonder why the court
did not utilize the "unitary business" nexus test in Williams. That
test was utilized in the Armco case decided the same day as Williams.
See subsection III (B) of this article infra for a discussion of Armco
and the "unitary business" nexus test.
In the first "drummer" case of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the Court observed that Congressional action was necessary
to provide a uniform national system governing state taxation of
interstate commerce. Otherwise, the disorder which prevailed under
the Articles of Confederation would be repeated. 45 In 1959, in re-
sponse to the Northwestern States Portland Cement opinion, 46 Con-
gress exercised its power granted by the commerce clause to regulate
interstate commerce. It enacted legislation to establish "minimum
standards" for the imposition of net income taxes on interstate busi-
Id. (citations ommited).
Williams & Co., 303 S.E.2d 737.
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1887).
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (upholding
apportioned net income taxes; maintaining an in-state office and employing resident representatives
constitute a sufficient nexus).
[Vol. 90
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/6
TEXTS FOR NEXUS IN TAX CASES
nesses.47 This statute prohibits states (or political subdivisions thereof)
from imposing a tax on, or measured by, net income derived by a
foreign corporation or nonresident individual within the state from
interstate commerce, if the only business activity within the state is
solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property, which
orders are sent outside the state for approval or rejection and, if
approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside
the state.
While this federal statute does not expressly apply to "gross re-
ceipts" taxes like the West Virginia business and occupation tax,
the "minimum standards" set forth therein are consistent with the
"drummer" line of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Moreover, because such minimum standards apply to net
income taxes, a fortiori they should be deemed to apply to "gross
receipts" taxes, which are, obviously, much more onerous. Ac-
cordingly, under existing precedents of the Supreme Court of the
United States, solicitation by nonresident representatives of a foreign
corporation does not constitute a substantial nexus for the purpose
of subjecting the business of selling goods to customers in this State
to the West Virginia business and occupation tax, at least where the
solicitation in this State is not essentially on a full-time basis.
B. Unitary business nexus test
In Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty48 another broad test emerged which
was theretofore unknown in tax nexus jurisprudence, specifically, a
"unitary business" nexus test. Actually, there were two precursors
to this holding in Armco. In a concurring opinion in J.C. Penney
Co. v. Hardesty,49 a business and occupation tax case, it was stated:
"The taxpayer cannot escape taxation by attempting to isolate his
local activities into compartments and by contending that each com-
partment must be viewed separately without regard to the taxpayer's
entire activities within the state."50 Conflicting statements on this
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1982).
41 Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 303 S.E.2d 706 (W. Va. 1983) rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S.
638 (1984).
41 J.C. Penney, 164 W. Va. 525, 264 S.E.2d 604.
1O Id. at 547, 264 S.E.2d at 617 (Miller, J., concurring).
1987]
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point were made in Western Maryland Ry. v. Goodwin.51 At one
point the author of that opinion remarked: "Neither is it necessary
for there to be a nexus between the particular in-state activities of
the taxpayer and the activity sought to be taxed."15 2 On the other
hand, he later stated in the same opinion:
[Tihe fact that appellee does not contest the validity of taxing its wholly in-state
business is at least persuasive that some nexus exists with regard to some op-
erations. That, however, is not dispositive since arguably appellee could have iden-
tifiable, separate, business operations which are so far removed from this State
as to make them immune to our taxation.
3
This last statement comports with currently binding precedents of the Supreme Court of
the United States. The two immediately preceding quotations do not. Nor does syllabus
point 2 of Armco:
Where a unitary business has a substantial nexus in this State through its qualifying
to do business in this State, and engaging in operations such as coal mining and
sales of metal products, we are not required to separate the activities of its various
divisions doing business in this State and treat them separately for purposes of
determining whether in isolation they have a sufficient connection to this State
to warrant imposition of a business and occupation tax.
54
This holding is in conflict with the opinions of the Supreme Court
of the United States in National Geographic, Complete Auto Transit,
American Oil, General Motors and Norton, discussed in section II
of this article.
In Armco, the foreign corporation had four divisions which had
contacts with West Virginia. One of these was the Mining Division.
It had coal mining operations in this State. The business and oc-
cupation tax with respect to these operations was paid and was not
in dispute in the case. The only contacts in this State of the Steel
Group division and of the Union Wire Rope Group division were
solicitation on a part-time basis in this State by nonresident rep-
resentatives. The Metal Products Division had an in-state office and
resident personnel there. This office and these personnel there did
not, however, facilitate the sales of metal buildings by Armco.
1' Western Md. Ry. v. Goodwin, 167 W. Va. 804, 282 S.E.2d 240 (1981) appeal dismessed for
want 'of a substantial federal question, 456 U.S. 952 (1982).
32 Western Md. Ry., 167 W. Va. at 809, 282 S.E.2d at 244.
53 Id. at 823, 282 S.E.2d at 252.
Armco, 303 S.E.2d at 707 (syl. pt. 2).
[Vol. 90
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/6
TEXTS FOR NEXUS IN TAX CASES
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Armco rejected
the claim that there was an insufficient nexus between the sales ac-
tivities of the three divisions in question and this State to sustain
the business and occupation tax. The court did not utilize the "pur-
posive-revenue-generating-activity" test to find a sufficient nexus.
Perhaps there was an emerging concern over the validity of that
test. In any event, the court held, instead, that the nexus provided
by the Mining Division provided all the nexus that was necessary
to tax the sales activities of the other three divisions, even though
those divisions' products and activities were shown to be unrelated
to the Mining Division. This result is based upon a misreading of
precedent and a unique misapplication of a net income tax appor-
tionment principle to a "gross receipts" tax nexus question.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was of the opinion
that there had been a "weakening" of Norton by General Motors
and Standard Pressed Steel.-5 The discussion of these cases in section
II of this article supra indicates that General Motors and Standard
Pressed Steel, as well as American Oil and National Geographic,
quote Norton approvingly for its transactional "dissociation" -from-
local-business principle in "gross receipts" tax cases. Moreover, Jus-
tice Clark, who dissented in Norton (as to the application of such
principle to the facts therein), and who authored General Motors,
did not criticize Norton at all, much less overrule or "weaken" it.
Likewise, Justice Douglas, who dissented in Norton (as to the ap-
plication of the "dissociation" principle to the facts therein), and
who authored Standard Pressed Steel, did not criticize Norton at
all, much less overrule or "weaken" it. The law in this area is
already sufficiently complex without anticipating changes by the high
Court and refashioning the rules for that Court in this classic federal
question area. 6
" Id. at 711.
" Courts in other states have concluded that Norton is still valid and is binding precedent. See,
e.g., State Dep't of Revenue v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 660 P.2d 1188 (Alaska 1983); Chicago Bridge
& Iron Co. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Wash. 2d 814, 659 P.2d 463, appeal dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983). Note that these cases were decided well after
the Complete Auto Transit case which the Supreme Court of the United States decided in 1977. In
Armco and other recent opinions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Complete Auto
1987]
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It is clear from Norton and its progeny that a factual "disso-
ciation" from local business activities and presence is permissible
even where the same type of products is involved in the local business
and in the transactions generated solely as the result of solicitation
on a part-time basis in this State by nonresident representatives of
the foreign corporation. A fortiori "dissociation" is permissible
where, as in Armco, unrelated product lines are involved. Otherwise,
there could be far-reaching results. A foreign corporation may be
involved in diversified business activities, such as manufacturing
chemicals and, for example, through a different division, selling ex-
ercise equipment. If the latter is accomplished in the taxing juris-
diction by instrumentalities of interstate commerce ("direct" mail
solicitation, network television advertising or solicitation on a part-
time basis in this State by nonresident representatives), it would
stretch the outer limits of nexus to sustain a business and occupation
tax on the clearly separate business of selling exercise equipment,
based upon the fact that there are chemical plants of the taxpayer
in the taxing state. Such a result ignores the nature of the business
and occupation tax.
For business and occupation tax purposes, an integrated (unitary)
business entity will be segregated into its separate components or
business to apply the appropriate tax classification to each of the
respective businesses engaged in by the same entity.5 7 This segre-
gation into separate businesses is in accord with the truly distinct
activities of the integrated (unitary) business. Thus, to hold that the
"dissociation" -from-local-business principle is invalid in business
Transit is seen as a major impetus in the "trend" toward upholding state taxation of interstate
commerce. However, as Justice Miller noted in his concurring opinion in J.C. Penney Co., "[tihe
intriguing part of Complete Auto is what it did not expressly decide: 'We note again that no claim
is made that the activity is not sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax,...' J.C. Penney,
164 W. Va. at 541, 264 S.E.2d at 614 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 279,
287 (1977)). Also see supra note 33 for a recognition that this trend of upholding taxation is hinged
upon there being a sufficient nexus in "gross receipts" tax cases.
" See West Virginia Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Hardesty, 167 W. Va. 511, 519, 280 S.E.2d 270,
275 (1981); Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc. v. Dailey, 167 W. Va. 587, 595, 280 S.E.2d 260, 265




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/6
TEXTS FOR NEXUS IN TAX CASES
and occupation tax cases "is to ignore business reality.' '5 In contrast,
in "unitary business" net income tax apportionment cases, courts
usually disregard the often artificial, bookkeeping compartmental-
ization by multi-jurisdictional business enterprises and, instead, con-
solidate all of the net income of such unitary businesses for
apportionment by statutory formula.
In addition to having the effect of ignoring business reality, to
invalidate the "dissociation" principle in business and occupation
tax cases by utilizing the "unitary business" principle is to convert
(for nexus purposes only) the business and occupation tax from being
an activity-based tax to being an income-based tax. The West Vir-
ginia business and occupation tax is not an income tax. "Our busi-
ness and occupation tax is levied on the privilege of selling or serving
within this state, and not on the sales themselves, or on income.''1 9
To make this point is not "to wax in semantic technicalities without
substance."' 6 Rather, it is to be consistent in examining the business
and occupation tax under each of the four prongs of Complete Auto
Transit's amalgamated due process clause/commerce clause test for
the validity of a so-called "gross receipts" tax.
61
In Armco, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, to ar-
rive at a sufficient nexus, applied the "unitary business" principle,
employed only in net income tax cases for apportionment purposes,
62
11 J.C. Penney, 164 W. Va. at 548, 264 S.E.2d at 617 (Miller, J., concurring) (an opinion
consolidating four separate cases). The "business reality" in the Penney opinion was that the taxpayer
had failed to "dissociate" its direct mail sales of catalog merchandise from its local store business.
Local stores displayed many of the same products sold in the catalogs; catalogs were available through
many of the local stores; and there otherwise was substantial local impetus to direct mall sales of
catalog merchandise. The result reached in Penney is consistent with the application of the "disso-
ciation" principle by the dissenters in Norton to the facts therein.
11 Hydraulics, Inc. v. Dailey, 301 S.E.2d 605, 608 (W. Va. 1983) (emphasis in original). Accord
Virginia Foods, 161 W. Va. at 102 n.4, 239 S.E.2d at 775 n.4; Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Haden,
153 W. Va. 721, 172 S.E.2d 126 (1969) (syl. pt. 3).
10 Cincinnati Milacron, 290 S.E.2d at 904.
61 See text accompanying supra note 22.
6 The cases in which the Supreme Court of the United States has actually applied the unitary
business principle are net income tax apportionment cases. See, e.g., Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, (1983) (collecting cases).
As quoted in Armco, 303 S.E.2d at 712 n.3, the Supreme Court of the United States included
General Motors, 377 U.S. 436, a "gross receipts" tax case, in a string cite of cases applying the
unitary business principle. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1982);
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while simultaneously rejecting the need to apply net income tax ap-
portionment principles. That is, in the Armco opinion of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the business and occupation
tax is a chameleon: at one time (for nexus purposes),it appears to
be a net income tax; at another time (for apportionment purposes)
it reverts to its natural color and is a "self-apportioning," activity-
based "gross receipts" tax.6
The "unitary business" principle may be described as follows.
A "unitary business" is a more-or-less integrated business enterprise
operating in more than one jurisdiction. Its total net income, wher-
ever earned, may be subjected to a state net income tax which ap-
portions the total net income based upon a statutory formula taking
into account objective estimates of the business enterprise's activities
within and without the taxing jurisdiction, such as property, payroll
and sales. The thrust of the concept is that a multi-jurisdictional
business whose centralized management contributes in definite but
often intangible ways to each of the geographical or transactional
components may, consistent with the due process and commerce
clauses, be subject to a net income tax of a given jurisdiction, as
accord Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 164. This inclusion of General Motors is not, however, accurate.
General Motors does not mention the unitary business principle, nor does it cite any of the unitary
business cases, in arriving at its "bundle-of-corporate-activity" nexus test. In a general discussion of
various types of state taxes on interstate commerce which had been upheld, General Motors does
refer to a net income tax case in which a proportional formula was applied to profits of a unitary
business. At the conclusion of the general discussion, however, General Motors distinguished gross
receipts tax cases from the net income tax cases: "However, local taxes measured by gross receipts
from interstate commerce have not always fared as well." General Motors, 377 U.S. at 440.
6 In discussing apportionment (but not nexus) in business and occupation tax cases, Justice
Miller in Armco states: "It must be kept in mind that our business and occupation tax is composed
of a number of individual taxes tied to specific business activities occurring within this State." Armco,
303 S.E.2d at 714. He strikes this same chord and elaborates upon it in his concurring opinion in
J.C. Penney:
A business and occupation tax levied on substantial activities of the taxpayer within the
taxing state is a fairly apportioned tax, because the local activities or transactions provide
not only the tax nexus, but also form the boundary of the tax incident. This State's business
and occupation tax is composed of a number of separate taxes on specific business activities
occurring within the State. The business and occupation tax does not give rise to the prob-
lems surrounding a state income tax, where some type of apportionment standard must be
built into the tax statute to segregate local income from that derived from out-of-state
sources. Here, the business and occupation tax has its roots in the local transaction, and
by its very nature carries its own proportionality.
J.C. Penney, 164 W. Va. at 550, 264 S.E.2d at 618-19 (footnote and citation omitted).
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long as at least some part of the business is conducted in that ju-
risdiction and as long as there is a rational relationship between the
income attributed to that jurisdiction and the intrastate values of
the enterprise.
The real concern in the unitary business (net income tax) cases
is the general fairness of the apportionment formula. Only "lip serv-
ice" is given to the nexus requirement. In such cases the nexus must
only be "general," that is, the nexus must only be between the taxing
jurisdiction and the "person" of the taxpayer, in the sense of any
activities or presence in the taxing jurisdiction. The activities are not
being taxed. It is the net income derived therefrom which is being
taxed. Therefore, identifying the activities generating the net income
is not very important. Instead, the focus in unitary business (net
incomed tax) cases is upon whether the income attributed to the
taxing jurisdiction is in fact out of all appropriate proportion to the
imprecisely identified business transacted in that jurisdiction.
The exact opposite is true in "gross receipts" tax cases. In such
cases the nexus must be "substantial" and "specific," that is, be-
tween the taxing jurisdiction and the subject of the tax, namely, the
activity or transaction in question. Complete Auto Transit is explicit
on this pointA4 In gross receipts tax cases "lip service" is given to
the "fair apportionment" requirement, not to the nexus require-
ment.65 Apportionment is accomplished in gross receipts tax cases
involving interstate sales by allowing taxation in the destination state
and prohibiting taxation in the state of origin for the goods.
In short, to apply a unitary business nexus test in a gross receipts
tax case is to remove the primary due process clause/commerce clause
limitation on the imposition of the business and occupation tax in
an interstate commerce context, specifically, a requirement that there
be a substantial local business presence which contributed to the
activity taxed. 66
64 Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
61 See supra note 33.
- The Supreme Court of the United States in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984),
held that the west Virginia business and occupation tax as to wholesale sales was unconstitutional
as discriminatory against interstate commerce. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the area of state taxation of interstate commerce, the real
issue is not whether out-of-state businesses must pay their "fair
share" of taxes in exchange for selling to customers in this State.
Of course, they should, if certain fundamental conditions are met.
The real issue is, when are those conditions met? To answer that
question, the judiciary of this State, in the absence of Congressional
action, must follow existing precedents of the Supreme Court of the
United States construing the due process clause and the commerce
clause. To do otherwise is to risk distorting those two tenets con-
tained in the most fundamental document of our civic existence.
discrimination issue. The Court expressly did "not reach Armco's argument that there was not a
sufficient nexus between the State and the sales at issue here to permit taxation of them." Id. at
641. The Court missed a golden opportunity to confront the issue of nexus in gross receipts tax cases.
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